






























The Link between the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply and 








Working Paper No. 1003 
March 2010 
D DE EP PA AR RT TM ME EN NT T   O OF F   E EC CO ON NO OM MI IC CS S
J JO OH HA AN NN NE ES S   K KE EP PL LE ER R   U UN NI IV VE ER RS SI IT TY Y   O OF F
L LI IN NZ Z
Johannes Kepler University of Linz 
Department of Economics 
Altenberger Strasse 69 
A-4040 Linz - Auhof, Austria 
www.econ.jku.at 
martin.halla@jku.at 
phone +43 (0)70 2468 -8706, -28706 (fax) 




The Link between the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply and Compliance 





University of Linz & IZA 
 
8












Recent economic literature emphasizes the importance of moral considerations to 
explain  compliance  behavior  with  respect  to  underground  activities  such  as  tax 
evasion. A considerable amount of research aims to identify factors that affect the 
intrinsic  motivation  to  comply.  However,  the  causal  link  between  the  intrinsic 
motivation to comply and actual compliance behavior is not established yet. We 
provide  a  discussion  of  the  underlying  identification  problem  and  suggest 
(potentially) feasible empirical strategies to uncover a causal effect. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In recent years, the economic literature on the shadow economy and tax evasion emphasized 
the importance of moral considerations (or social norms) to explain compliance behavior.2 
Likewise, research on public enforcement of law increasingly considers social norms because 
of their role to substitute or to complement formal laws, and because of the potential impact of 
laws on social norms (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). This trend most likely results from the fact 
that neo-classical models of compliance – in the spirit of the economics-of-crime approach – 
over-predict real-world compliance. Many scholars therefore conclude that the explanation for 
the tendency to comply must be that individuals are obeying a norm (Posner, 2000). 
As a response, theoretical papers incorporated individuals with an intrinsic motivation 
to comply (e.g. Gordon, 1989; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Traxler, 2010). More recently, an 
increasing number of empirical papers (to be discussed below) try to quantify this intrinsic 
motivation with survey data. In most of the cases scholars study the case of tax evasion, and 
analyze the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, which is known as tax morale.3 The increasing 
popularity of theses studies can be shown by the number of papers indexed in Google Scholar 
over time.4 Figure 1 shows that the number of published papers on tax morale was below ten 
per year throughout the 1990s. However, thereafter the number sharply increased, and since 
2006 we are observing more than 100 papers per year.5 
 
[Figure1 somewhere around here] 
 
These papers typically aim to identify factors (both on an individual- and a country-level) that 
affect the level of tax morale. A substantial amount of empirical evidence on the association 
between  tax  morale  and  several  socio-demographic  characteristics  from  national  and 
international samples is available.6 Further, a number of papers identified different institutional 
arrangements that are correlated with a high level of tax morale (e.g. Torgler, 2005a). 
                                                 
2 For a general discussion of moral considerations and social norms within economics see, for instance, Elster 
(1989), Posner (1997), and Posner (2002). 
3 A smaller number of papers deal with benefit morale, i.e. with the individual reluctance to exploit the state via 
benefit fraud. See, for instance, Halla and Schneider (2008), Heinemann (2008), and Halla, Lackner and Schneider 
(2010). 
4 Google Scholar, a freely-accessible Web search engine, indexes the full text of scholarly literature across an 
array of publishing formats and disciplines. It includes most peer-reviewed journals of large scholarly publishers. 
For more information see http://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html. 
5To be precise, German scholars around Günter Schmölders known as the ‘Cologne school of tax psychology’ 
already  tried  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  to  build  a  bridge  between  economics  and  social  psychology.  They 
emphasized the  importance of tax  morale  to explain tax  compliance behavior. See,  for instance, Schmölders 
(1951/52, 1960, 1969). 
6 For a survey of this literature see Torgler (2007). - 3 - 
These papers all – explicitly or implicitly – presume that tax morale affects actual compliance. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that an intrinsic motivation to comply captured by 
survey data, does not measure individual behavior but an individual attitude. That means a 
high  intrinsic  motivation  to  comply  does  not  necessarily  translate  into  a  high  level  of 
compliance. In fact, relatively little empirical evidence on the impact of an intrinsic motivation 
to comply on actual compliance behavior exists.7 Most likely, this is due to the fact that is 
extremely  hard  to  identify  this  causal  link.  First,  one  has  to  obtain  and  quantify  both 
dimensions. In the case of compliance behavior, this is a non-trivial problem, since any form of 
non-compliance is difficult to observe. In general, non-compliant behavior cannot be measured 
and has to be estimated. The intrinsic motivation to comply has to be obtained by adequate 
survey techniques. Given that one can observe and link both dimensions, one needs a credible 
research design to establish a causal effect. 
With  respect  to  tax  evasion  almost  all  existing  evidence  is  based  on  survey  data. 
Obviously, this research design is problematic, since the accuracy of self-reported tax evasion 
information is questionable. A small number of papers try to solve this limitation by combining 
tax evasion data observed in laboratory experiments with information from post-experiment 
questionnaires.  With  respect  to  the  shadow  economy  a  number  of  papers  present  simple 
correlations between the level of tax morale and the size of the shadow economy. However, 
this descriptive evidence allows several interpretations. It is unclear, whether a causal effect of 
tax morale on the size of the shadow economy exists. Most recently, a small number of papers 
(Torgler  and  Schneider,  2007,  2009;  Torgler,  Schaffner  and  Macintyre,  2007)  address  this 
identification problem and suggest an instrumental variable approach to disentangle a causal 
effect. 
We  think  a  good  understanding  of  the  relation  between  the  intrinsic  motivation  to 
comply and actual compliance behavior is very important. Future research in this area should 
pursue  empirical  strategies  that  are  able  to  establish  a  causal  link  between  these  two 
dimensions. The existence of this causal link determines the significance of the whole strand of 
literature that analyses the determinants of the intrinsic motivation to comply. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  discuss  the 
necessary  steps  to  establish  this  causal  link,  which  includes  a  definition  of  the  shadow 
economy that fits the question under consideration. Following that we summarize the literature 
that aims to quantify the related phenomena of tax evasion. Thereby, we will evaluate which 
methods produce data points that can be used to answer the question under consideration. 
                                                 
7 We will discuss the existing evidence in detail below. - 4 - 
Subsequently we will provide an overview of all publicly available survey data that are useful 
to measure the intrinsic motivation to abstain from underground activities, tax evasion, and 
benefit fraud. Under the assumption that we can observe and link both, the intrinsic motivation 
to comply and compliance behavior, we will discuss the econometric identification problem 
and highlight the necessary assumptions in order to establish a causal effect. 
Based on these findings, Section 3 critically reviews the existing literature. At this stage 
we fully acknowledge that a clear identification of this causal effect is extremely difficult. 
However, we believe that only a thorough discussion of the identifying assumptions and their 
credibility  allows  steps  forward.  We  do  not  provide  a  solution  to  solve  the  identification 
problem in this paper. However, we try to contribute to this literature by providing a clear 
discussion of the identification problem. 
Before we conclude in Section 5, we briefly highlight in Section 4 the importance of 
unobserved heterogeneity for the case of tax morale and the shadow economy. 
 
2.  Establishing a Link between Attitude and Behavior 
 
In  order  to  identify  a  causal  link  between  the  intrinsic  motivation  to  comply  and  actual 
compliance behavior one has to overcome a number of obstacles. First, one has to observe and 
link both dimensions. In a second step, a research design, most likely based on an instrumental 
variable approach, is needed. 
 
2.1  Measuring Compliance Behavior 
 
To start with, one has to decide which specific form of compliance should be studied. As usual, 
this choice (should be guided by the relevance of the question and) is limited by the availability 
of  data.  In  the  case  of  compliance,  this  problem  is  non-trivial  since  any  form  of  non-
compliance  is  difficult  to  observe.  In  general,  non-compliant  agents  will  try  to  hide  their 
behavior  in  order  to  avoid  punishment.  That  means,  non-compliant  behavior  cannot  be 
observed and has to be estimated. 
This  complicates  an  a  priori  assessment  of  the  significance  of  the  issue  and  may 
obscure an evaluation of the (quality of the) available data. The choice is further complicated 
by the fact that different forms of non-compliance that are usually studied by economists – 
such as underground economic activities and tax evasion – may overlap and are not mutually - 5 - 
exclusive. Therefore, the choice over the specific form of compliance will inevitably be related 
with the selection of its estimation method.8 
 
2.1.1  Defining the Shadow Economy 
In the economic literature there is no agreement on the definition of the shadow economy or on 
the method to estimate its size.9 For instance, the OECD10 uses a very broad definition that 
specifies five groups of activities that are collectively said to comprise the shadow economy11: 
-  (i) underground production, defined as those activities that are productive and legal but 
are deliberately concealed from the public authorities to avoid payment of taxes or 
complying with regulations; 
-  (ii) illegal production, defined as those productive activities that generate goods and 
services  forbidden  by  law  or  that  are  unlawful  when  carried  out  by  unauthorized 
producers; 
-  (iii) informal sector production, defined as those productive activities conducted by 
unincorporated enterprises in the household sector that are unregistered and/or are less 
than a specified size in terms of employment, and that have some market production; 
-  (iv) production of households for own final use, defined as those productive activities 
that  result  in  goods  or  services  consumed  or  capitalized  by  the  households  that 
produced them; and 
-  (v) production missed due to deficiencies in data collection program, defined as all the 
productive activities that should be accounted for by the basic data collection program 
but are missed due to statistical deficiencies. It is sometimes referred to as the statistical 
underground. 
 
For  the  purpose  of  the  question  under  consideration  a  narrower  definition  of  the  shadow 
economy  is  reasonable.  We  suggest  restricting  the  definition  of  the  shadow  economy  to 
activities  captured  by  the  underground  production.  All  other  categories  are  either  not 
(unambiguously) related to non-compliance behavior, or are not within the usual domain of 
this  strand  of  literature.  The  production  of  households  for  own  final  use  is  clearly  not 
connected to non-compliance behavior. In the case of the informal sector production it is less 
                                                 
8 A possible way to avoid this problem is laboratory experiments. 
9 See, for instance, Frey and Schneider (2001). 
10 See OECD (2002); this is a joint publication of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
the International Monetary Fund, the International Labour Organisation, and the Statistical Committee of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
11 To be precise, OECD (2002) uses the term non-observed economy. - 6 - 
clear, since there can be some overlap. For instance, informal sector enterprises may prefer to 
remain unregistered in order to avoid compliance with regulations and to minimize production 
costs  (see,  OECD  2002,  page  39).  However,  since  these  activities  are  not  necessarily 
performed with the deliberate intention of non-complying (such as tax evasion, infringing labor 
legislation or other regulations) we argue to exclude this category. Finally illegal production, 
such as sale of drugs or trafficking stolen  goods, is by  definition non-compliant behavior. 
However,  these  forms  of  non-compliance  are  usually  not  studied  (by  economists)  with  a 
reference to an intrinsic motivation to comply. 
Our recommended definition of the shadow economy comprises therefore as stated by 
OECD (2002) on page 37 “only activities that may be both productive in an economic sense 
and  also  quite  legal  (provided  certain  standards  or  regulations  are  complied  with)  but 
deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following kinds of reasons”: 
-  to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; 
-  to avoid the payment of social security contributions; 
-  to avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maximum 
hours, safety or health standards, etc.; 
-  to  avoid  complying  with  certain  administrative  procedures,  such  as  completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms (see OECD, 2002, page 38). 
 
Therefore, this definition of the shadow economy covers well-known practices such as under-
reporting of income in order to avoid taxation, fraudulent receipt of unemployment benefits, 
unofficially operating enterprises who want avoid long and costly bureaucratic procedures, or 
infringement of employment regulations or immigration laws by firms who hire labor “off the 
books”. Clearly, this quantity is related to tax evasion. But it does not cover all forms of tax 
evasion.  It  includes  some  methods  of  tax  evasion  (e.g.  under-reporting  of  income),  and 
excludes others that are non-productive, such as over-claiming deductions or exemptions.12 
The  economic  literature  offers  various  so-called  direct  and  indirect  approaches  to 
estimate the size of the shadow economy, and a full review of the existing methods is well 
beyond the scope of this paper.13 In general, the methods that are used to estimate the size of 
the shadow economy and the extent of tax evasion largely overlap. In the next section, we will 
                                                 
12 Tanzi (1999) provides a detailed discussion of the nexus between the shadow economy and tax evasion. 
13 For a comprehensive review of the literature on the shadow economy, see, Schneider and Enste (2000). Some 
recent applications are Lemieux, Fortin and Fréchette, (1994); Lyssiotou, Pashardes and Stengos, (2004) and 
Breusch (2005). - 7 - 
briefly discuss these methods, and evaluate which methods produce data points that can be 
used to answer the question under consideration. 
 
2.1.2  Measuring Tax Evasion 
Compared to the shadow economy, it is probably easier to find a consensus among economic 
scholars on the definition of tax evasion.
14 In reality, however, there are many grey areas where 
the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance is not so clear. Both tax evasion and tax 
avoidance are an attempt to reduce ones own tax liabilities. They only differ in legal respects. 
Tax  evasion  is  an  illegal  activity,  whereas  tax  avoidance  is  consistent  with  existing  law. 
However, even tax authorities may often inappropriately characterise particular cases (Slemrod 
and  Yitzhaki,  2002).15  Several  approaches  to  estimate  the  extent  of  tax  evasion  –  on  an 
individual- and a more aggregate-level – have been suggested in the literature.16 
One  category  is  called  direct  approaches.  Traditionally,  researchers  tried  to  collect 
individual-level  data  on  tax  evasion  with  survey  techniques.  This  has  the  advantage  that 
questions  on  tax  morale  can  be  added  easily.  However,  the  accuracy  of  self-reported  tax 
evasion information is highly questionable. Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing, (1987) managed to 
link tax audit data for approximately 700 Dutch taxpayers with survey responses. They show 
that the correlation between assessed and self-reported tax evasion is essentially zero. 
In principal, the most reliable information about tax evasion should be obtained by tax 
audits. However, it is widely recognized that even intensive audits are not able to reveal all 
kinds of non-compliance (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). Moreover, regular tax audits do not 
constitute a representative sample. In general, tax authorities do not randomly select taxpayers 
to  audit,  but  use  properties  of  submitted  returns  which  indicate  the  likelihood  of 
noncompliance.17 Consequently, the best available source is data from randomly assigned tax 
audits, such as the U.S. Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP).18 However, 
this data has the disadvantage that it does not include information on tax morale. In general, it 
is challenging to obtain survey responses that can be linked with tax audit data. It is likely 
                                                 
14 The development of the literature through the 1980s is surveyed by Cowell (1990). More recent literature 
surveys are provided by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998); Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002); and Slemrod (2007). 
15 Denis Healey, a former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, phrased it strikingly: “The difference between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion is the thickness of a prison wall”. 
16 As mentioned before, most of these approaches are also to infer on the size of the shadow economy. 
17 Similarly, data from tax amnesties have a sample selection problem (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998). 
18 Under the TCMP, the Examination Branch of the Internal Revenues Service (IRS) periodically conducted (until 
the  late  1980s)  random  in-depth  audits  to  estimate  compliance  and  revenue  lost  from  non-compliance.  The 
resulting  data  consisted  of  detailed  information  about  what  the  taxpayer  reported,  and  what  the  examiner 
concluded was correct. - 8 - 
ineffective if the IRS sends a questionnaire to U.S. taxpayers asking about their tax morale. 
Moreover, survey data collected by other institutions may often not be linkable to tax audit 
data due to privacy law concerns.19 
An alternative direct approach to obtain individual-level data taken in the literature is 
based  on  laboratory  experiments.  For  an  early  application,  see,  Friedland,  Maital  and 
Rutenberg (1978). Clearly, the shortcoming of this data is the artificial setting in which it is 
generated. For instance, it is unclear whether individuals would behave differently when they 
deal with real tax authorities instead of experimenters. However, it has the advantage that it can 
be augmented by tax morale information form pre- or post-experimental questionnaires (see, 
e.g. Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Torgler, Schaffner and Macintyre, 2007). Certainly, it has to be 
carefully checked, whether pre-experimental questionnaires affect compliance behavior and/or 
compliance behavior affects answers in post-experimental questionnaires. 
A second category discussed in the literature is indirect approaches. These methods 
usually provide more aggregated estimates of tax evasion. Typically, these approaches rely on 
inferring  the  levels  or  trends  in  tax  evasion  from  observable  quantities,  such  as  currency 
demand  or  national  income  and  product  accounts.  Clearly,  these  approaches  are  able  to 
produce tax evasion estimates for a large set of countries and years. These can be matched with 
country-averages of tax morale from international surveys. However, one has to note that these 
approaches have been heavily criticized in the literature on tax evasion. For instance, Slemrod 
and Yitzhaki (2002) conclude that “none of these approaches is likely to be reliable […] as 
their accuracy depends either on unverifiable assumptions or on how well the demand for 
currency is estimated”. 
Most recently, a small number of papers (e.g. Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Sabirianova Peter, 2009) combine economic theory and natural experiments to obtain estimates 
of tax evasion. While this seems to be in general a very promising direction of research, their 
results cannot be used for our question under consideration. Typically, these methods provide 
only a few data points, which are hard to link with tax morale data. 
 
2.2  Measuring the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply 
 
The selection of the method to quantify the intrinsic motivation to comply seems to be rather 
straightforward. Since one tries to measure an attitude, the only available choice is survey 
                                                 
19 The aforementioned paper by Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing (1987) provides a notable exception. - 9 - 
techniques. The more challenging part is the design of the survey questions. Among others, the 
formulation of the survey question has to target the form of compliance under consideration. 
Table  A1  and  A2  (in  the  Appendix)  provide  an  overview  on  all  publicly  available 
international survey  data that is useful to measure the intrinsic motivation to abstain from 
underground activities, tax evasion, and benefit fraud. Only a few survey programs include 
questions on the intrinsic motivation to comply. Fortunately, these are all very well organized 
ongoing academic projects that cover a reasonable number of respondents from a large set of 
countries. 
 
2.2.1  Measuring Tax Morale 
The most extensive data is available to measure tax morale. To our best knowledge, there are 
four  international  survey  data-sets  available:  (i)  the  European  and  World  Values  Surveys 
(WVS),  (ii)  the  European  Social  Survey  (ESS),  (iii)  the  International  Social  Survey 
Programme (ISSP), and (iv) the Latinobarometro.20 Each survey is a pooled cross-sectional 
data. 
As Table A1 shows, each survey differs in the exact formulation of the question, the 
possible answer categories, and the available country-years. The WVS and the ESS offer both 
two different questions on tax morale. The first question in the WVS (
WVS TM1 ) refers to tax 
morale in a very general way: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you 
think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Cheating on taxes 
if you have a chance”. Respondents are asked to evaluate on an ordered scale from “never 
justifiable” (1) to “always justifiable” (10). The second question (
WVS TM2 ) is more specific, 
“[…] Paying cash for services to avoid taxes”, and offers the same scale to answer. Similar, the 
ESS asks first (
ESS TM1 ) “How much you agree or disagree with each of these statements: 
Citizens should not cheat on their taxes”, and then (
ESS TM2 ) “How wrong, if at all, do you 
consider the following ways of behaving to be? How wrong is someone paying cash with no 
receipt so as to avoid paying VAT or other taxes?”. In the first case respondents can answer on 
a five-point scale, in the second case on a four-point scale. The only available question in the 
ISSP  (
ISSP TM )  is  more  specific,  and  refers  to  tax  cheating  via  income  under-reporting: 
“Consider the following situations below. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer 
does not report all of his or her income in order to pay less income tax?”. The scale of answers 
ranges from “not wrong” (1) to “seriously wrong” (4). 
                                                 
20 Due to the rather specific geographic restriction we will not cover the Latinobarometro in this paper. For further 
information, see http://www.latinobarometro.org/. - 10 - 
WVS TM1  offers by far the most observations and is, therefore, the most widely  used 
variable to study tax morale. It was included in each of the four survey waves (covering the 
time period from 1981 to 2003). Information on respondents from 80 countries was collected 
and in sum data from 184 country-years is available. 
WVS TM 2 was only asked in the fourth wave 
and provides data from 33 country-years. 
ESS TM1  and 
ESS TM2  were both included in the second 
wave of the ESS, where fieldwork was conducted between April, 2004 and December, 2006. In 
each  case  information  from  respondents  from  25  countries  is  available. 
ISSP TM   has  been 
collected in 1991 and 1998. In sum, this provides data from 48 country-years. 
It is a priori not clear how the ideal survey question to capture tax morale should be 
formulated. However, one could argue that a more general formulation, (i.e. that does not only 
refer to one method of tax evasion) is preferable. Given this criteria, 
WVS TM1  and 
ESS TM1  are 
superior to 
WVS TM 2 , 
ESS TM2  and 
ISSP TM . Nevertheless, it would be reassuring if the correlation 
between responses from different questions within one survey is high. This can be checked for 
the WVS and ESS. The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between 
WVS TM1  and 
WVS TM 2  is 
in the full sample on an individual-level (38,560 observations from 33 countries) equal to 0.52 
and the hypothesis of a zero rank correlation can be rejected with at a significance level below 
0.001. For the ESS (44,802 observations from 25 countries) we observe a considerably lower 
correlation  of  0.28  between  the  two  alternative  measures  of  tax  morale.  Nevertheless,  the 
hypothesis of a zero rank correlation can again be rejected at a significance level below 0.001. 
Notably, on a country-level the correlation coefficients are more pronounced (WVS: 0.70 and 
ESS: 0.58). 
 
[Table 1 and Table 2 somewhere around here] 
 
  Table 1 and Table 2 provide descriptive statistics on the tax morale variables per 
country. In the case of the WVS (see column 5 in Table 1) the correlation coefficients vary 
between 0.29 (Romania) and 0.67 (Germany and Portugal). In each country the hypothesis of a 
zero rank correlation can be rejected. As expected, the ESS (see column 4 in Table 2) shows 
lower within country correlations, but still, independence can be rejected in each case at a 
significance level below 0.001. Interestingly, in both surveys the Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficients between the two alternative measures of tax morale are not significantly correlated 
with the number of observations, or with the level of the country-mean of either tax morale - 11 - 
variable.21 In the case of the WVS both variables are measured on the same scale and their 
means can be compared. As column 3 shows, in most of the cases the level of tax morale is 
higher for the more general question, 
Ideally, different measures of tax morale are not only highly correlated within surveys, 
but also across surveys. Unfortunately, there is little overlap between the available country-
years of the different surveys. In fact, it is impossible to compare the variables from the ESS 
with those from the WVS and the ISSP. However, there is some overlap between the WVS and 
the ISSP. In order to gain some more country-years for this comparison, we extrapolate each 
country average of 
WVS TM1 , 
WVS TM 2  and 
ISSP TM  by one year forward. That means we impute 
all missing country-averages of tax morale in year t with the value of the preceding year (t-1). 
As  Table  3  shows,  there  is  a  positive,  but  only  modest,  correlation  (0.24,  N=41)  between 
WVS TM1  and 
ISSP TM .22 However, if we drop two observations on Austria – which are certainly 
outliers in the ISSP-sample – the correlation increases to 0.43 (N=39), and independence can 
be rejected at a significance level below 0.01. The correlation between 
WVS TM 2  and 
ISSP TM  is 
practically zero (0.08, N=20). This result remains unchanged, even if the one observation on 
Austria is excluded.23  
 
[Table 3 somewhere around here] 
 
In a final step we check whether the interrelation between alternative measures of tax 
morale  and  individual  characteristics  is  similar  within  and  across  surveys.  Therefore,  we 
regress 
WVS TM1 , 
WVS TM 2 , 
ESS TM1   and 
ESS TM2   on  basic  socio-economic  characteristics.  We 
manage to measure the dimensions of age, sex, marital status, children, educational attainment, 
household income and labor market status (base category is employed) in both surveys on an 
almost equal scale.24 After cleaning the data-sets, about 30,700 observations from the WVS 
and about 16,600 from the ESS remain25. Estimation results are presented in Table 4. For all 
                                                 
21 Results are not shown in paper, but available upon request. 
22 Without imputation the correlation between 
WVS TM1 and 
ISSP TM  is equal to 0.34 (N=5). 
23 Without imputation there are no observations for a comparison of 
WVS TM2  and 
ISSP TM  available. 
24 Details on the definition of the variables are provided in the notes to Table 4. 
25 In the case of the WVS (compare Table 1) we had to exclude all 954 observations from Portugal from the 
regression analysis, since household income is only available on a 6-point scale. Another 6,833 observations 
(from various countries) are excluded due to missing information on one or more covariates. In the case of the 
EES (compare Table 2) we had to exclude all observations from France (1,784), Estonia (1,772), Hungary (1,420) 
and  Ukraine  (1,612).  For  France  and  Hungary  information  on  self-employment  is  missing.  For  Estonia  and 
Ukraine  no  information  on  the  household  income  is  provided.  Another  9,436  observations  (from  various 
countries) are excluded due to missing information on one or more covariates. In most of these cases non-response 
on the household income question is responsible. The Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between the two - 12 - 
four measurements of tax morale we find consistent results with respective to the estimated 
coefficients’ signs. (The only exception is the size of the place of residence). In most of the 
cases, even the statistical significance coincides across estimations. As previously found in the 
literature (see, e.g. Halla and Schneider, 2008) a higher age, being female, being married, a 
higher educational attainment, and being out of labor force (compared to being employed) are 
associated  with  a  higher  level  of  tax  morale.  Whereas,  a  high  household  income,  self-
employment, and unemployment are negatively correlated with the intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes. The only notable difference is that the share of explained variation is comparably low in 
the case of 
ESS TM1 . 
 
[Table 4 somewhere around here] 
 
2.2.2  Measuring Benefit Morale 
We are aware of two international surveys, the WVS and the ISSP, that include a question to 
study the phenomenon of benefit morale, i.e. the intrinsic motivation to abstain from cheating 
on  the  state  via  benefit  fraud.  Table  2A  shows  the  exact  formulation  of  the  question,  the 
possible answer categories, and the available country-years. 
The question on benefit morale (
WVS BM ) in the WVS questionnaire is very similar to 
WVS TM1 , and reads as follows: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you 
think  it  can  always  be  justified,  never  be  justified,  or  something  in  between:  Claiming 
governments benefits to which you are not entitled”. Again, respondents are asked to evaluate 
on an ordered scale from “never justifiable” (1) to “always justifiable” (10). The available 
question in the ISSP (
ISSP BM ) is a little bit more specific and refers to providing incorrect 
information: “Consider the following situations below. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if 
a person gives the government incorrect information about himself to get government benefits 
that he is not entitled to?”. The scale of answers ranges from “not wrong” (1) to 4 “seriously 
wrong” (4).26 
WVS BM  was included in each of the four survey waves. Information on respondents 
from  80  countries  covering  data  from  186  country-years  is  available. 
ISSP BM   has  been 
collected in 1991 and 1998. In sum, this provides data only 48 country-years. 
                                                                                                                                                            
alternative tax morale variables in the reduced samples (WVS: 0.52, ESS: 0.30) are very similar to those from the 
full samples discussed above. 
26 It should be noted that the ESS asks, “Suppose you planned to get benefits or services you were not entitled to. 
How many of your friends or relatives do you think you could ask for support?”. This question is not perfectly 
suited to capture benefit morale, but rather measures the (perceived) benefit morale among the respondent’s circle 
of friends and acquaintances. - 13 - 
In order to check the correlation between the two available measurements of benefit 
morale, we apply the same imputation procedure as in the case of tax morale. The correlation 
between 
WVS BM  and 
ISSP BM  is positive (0.20, N=41), however, not statistically significant 
from  zero  at  conventional  significance  levels  (p-value  is  equal  to  0.20).  If  we  restrict  our 
sample  to  observations  without  imputations  only  5  observations  are  left,  however,  the 
correlation increases to 0.85. 
Finally, one may also be interested in the correlation between tax morale and benefit 
morale.27 Table 3 shows that tax morale and benefit morale are highly correlated within a 
survey. The correlation between tax morale in one survey, and benefit morale in another survey 
is, however, practically zero. 
To sum up this section, we have shown that available measurements of tax morale and 
benefit morale are quite consistent within a given survey and to a lesser extent across surveys. 
While  we  think  that  all  discussed  variables  are  suitable  to  study  the  question  under 
consideration, we have  a slight preference for variables based on more general formulated 
survey questions. Clearly, in terms of available data points the WVS is superior to ISSP and 
the ESS. Unfortunately, no survey question that explicitly (or comprehensively) refers to the 
shadow economy is available. A major shortcoming is that no data source offers individual-
level panel data on the intrinsic motivation to comply. 
 
2.3  The Identification Problem 
 
In the ideal case, the researcher has access to information on both variables for a random 
sample of people on an individual-level, combined with a large set of covariates Xit, over time 
t. While it is practically impossible to obtain a data-set that fulfils all these criteria, we will for 
a moment assume that it exists.28 This data-set would allow us to estimate an equation of the 
following form: 
 
. it it it it attitude behaviour e b a + + × + = ΓX   (1) 
 
Assuming that  it attitude  and  it e  are uncorrelated, an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) 
would give us a 
OLS b  that is equal to an unbiased estimate of the causal impact of the intrinsic 
motivation to comply on actual compliance behavior. Whether this necessary assumption is 
fulfilled, depends crucially on the set of covariates Xit. Since OLS is a control strategy, we can 
                                                 
27 Halla and Schneider (2008) provide a more elaborate discussion. 
28 Alternatively, one may think of repeated observations of countries c over time t. - 14 - 
increase  the  likelihood  to  observe  an  unbiased  estimate  by  controlling  for  a  large  set  of 
covariates.29 In particular, Xit has to include all variables that affect  it behaviour  and that are 
correlated  with  it attitude .  However,  many  determinants  of  it behaviour   (such  as  an  innate 
disposition to comply or aspects of socialization) are most likely unobservable. If these factors 
are correlated with  it attitude , the OLS-estimate is biased. 
One way to mitigate this problem is controlling for individual fixed effects  i d . These 
account for unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity. Adding in addition year fixed 
effects  i z  we get the following equation: 
 
. it t i it it it attitude behaviour e z d b a + + + + × + = ΓX   (2) 
 
The fixed effects model in (2) gives an unbiased estimate of the causal effect, as long as the 
relevant  it attitude  is not correlated with time-varying unobservables that affect  it behaviour , 
and  reversed  causality  can  be  ruled  out.  Are  these  reasonable  assumptions?  It  is  hard  to 
evaluate  the  case  of  time-varying  omitted  variables  on  a  general  basis.  However,  reversed 
causality (or simultaneity) cannot be ruled out, or seems almost highly likely.
30 While it is 
plausible  to  assume  that  the  intrinsic  motivation  to  comply  ( it attitude )  affects  actual 
compliance behaviour ( it behaviour ), it is also reasonable that actual behaviour has an impact 
on individuals’ attitude. That means, individuals justify or confirm their own (self-interested) 
behaviour.31 If this hypothesis is true, then the fixed effects estimate from (2) is inconsistent.32 
A potential estimation strategy to solve endogeneity problems, such as this simultaneity 
bias,  is  an  instrumental  variable  (IV)  approach.33  An  IV  approach  can  give  a  consistent 
estimate when OLS cannot. Therefore, a valid IV, let’s call it  it z , has to be available. The IV 
has to be correlated with  it attitude , but uncorrelated with any other determinant of  it behaviour . 
The second requirement can be stated as follows:  ( ) 0 , = it it z Cov e . Since  it e  is unobserved, 
there is no way to prove that an IV is actually valid. The researcher must rely on theoretical 
                                                 
29 It should be noted that more control variables is not necessary better. If variables are themselves outcome 
variables, then they should not be included in the regression. For a detailed discussion see chapter 3 in Angrist and 
Pischke (2009). Therefore, in our case, we should not control for factors that are determined by the intrinsic 
motivation to comply. 
30 Another source of contemporaneous correlation between  it attitude  and  it e is measurement error in the intrinsic 
motivation to comply. 
31 We will discuss this hypothesis in more detail in the next section. 
32 See, for instance, Wooldridge (2002) for a formal discussion. 
33 An IV approach will be especially important, if one cannot control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. - 15 - 
justifications in order to persuade critical readers.34 As usual, the hardest part is to find such a 
credible IV. In fact, specific advice does not exist. Angrist and Krueger (2001) recommend that 
“progress comes from detailed institutional knowledge and the careful  investigation of the 
forces at work”. 
To sum up, we argue in this section that it seems impossible to identify the causal effect 
of the intrinsic motivation to comply on actual compliance behavior, without an IV approach. 
 
3.  Existing Evidence: A Short but Critical Review 
 
3.1.  Tax Morale and Tax Evasion  
 
With respect to tax evasion almost all evidence is based on survey data. A number of papers 
contrast self-reported tax evasion with different measurements of an intrinsic motivation to 
comply.35 For instance, Torgler, Demir, Macintyre and Schaffner (2008) examine the relation 
between self-reported tax evasion and tax morale based on survey data from the U.S. and 
Turkey. Their regression analysis shows that a high level of tax morale is associated with a low 
level  of  tax  evasion.  One  obvious  critique  of  such  a  research  design  is  the  questionable 
accuracy of self-reported tax evasion data. 
In order to solve this problem, some papers (e.g. Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Torgler, 
Schaffner and Macintyre, 2007) combine tax evasion data observed in laboratory experiments 
with tax morale information from post-experiment questionnaires, and confirm the findings 
obtained with survey data. However, it is not clear whether the answers in the questionnaire are 
independent  from  the  behaviour  in  the  experiment.  Therefore,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the 
intrinsic motivation to comply with the tax law causally affects compliance behaviour. The 
correlation between these two variables can be explained by simultaneity or reversed causality. 
If individuals justify or confirm their own self-interested behaviour, then actual behaviour has 
an impact on individuals’ moral considerations (Wenzel, 2005). In line with this argument, 
Halla and Schneider (2008) point out that tax morale deteriorates with rising income, while 
benefit morale improves with rising income. The authors conclude that individuals who have 
comparably more opportunities and low cost to commit a certain offense develop the attitude 
that it is a minor offence. Rich people have comparably more opportunities to commit tax 
evasion;  they  self-servingly  adjust  their  attitude  that  cheating  on  taxes  is  more  or  less 
                                                 
34 For a further discussion and aspects of estimation, see, for instance, Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
35 Other papers, such as Kaplan and Reckers (1985); Webley, Cole and Eidjar (2001), study the relation between 
the  perceived  prevalence  of  tax  evasion  among  others,  and  the  respondent’s  own  self-reported  compliance 
behavior. - 16 - 
justifiable. For poor people it is easer to fraudulently collect benefits; they report that benefit 
fraud is not a big deal.  
In sum, we are not aware of any convincing empirical evidence that tax morale has a 
causal impact on tax compliance. 
 
3.2.  Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy  
 
With  respect  to  the  shadow  economy  some  papers  report  a  negative  correlation  between 
average  levels  of  tax  morale  and  the  size  of  the  shadow  economy:  Weck  (1983),  Torgler 
(2005b) for Latin America, Alm and Torgler (2006) for the U.S. and Europe, Alm, Martinez-
Vazquez, Torgler (2006) for several transition countries, and Barone and Mocetti (2009) for 
Italy. As in the case of tax evasion, these descriptive results allow different interpretations. 
First, a low level of tax morale may causally impact peoples’ behaviour, which results in a 
bigger shadow economy. Second, a pronounced shadow economy may undermine peoples’ tax 
morale. Or third, the correlation may just be driven by an unobserved factor, such as complex 
tax legislation. 
Most recently, a small number of papers (Torgler and Schneider, 2007, 2009; Torgler, 
Schaffner and Macintyre, 2007) tries to disentangle the causal effect of tax morale on the size 
of the shadow economy based on an IV approach. In each case the authors use a definition of 
the shadow economy as suggest in Section 2.1.1. The estimates of the size of the shadow 
economy  are  based  on  a  combination  of  the  DYMIMIC-method  and  the  currency  demand 
method.36 Tax morale is captured as country-averages based on a re-scaled variable from the 
WVS (and the Latinobarometro). Since each paper has a different focus, the exact sample, the 
set of control variables, and the suggested IV’s vary. In essence, Torgler and Schneider, (2009) 
present a cross-sectional analysis of the effect of tax morale and institutional quality on the size 
of the shadow economy, where the authors try to account for the endogeneity of tax morale and 
institutional  quality  with  a  set  of  IV’s,  such  as  legal  origins  of  commercial  laws.  Torgler, 
Schaffner and Macintyre, 2007 include a panel data analysis of the impact of tax morale on the 
size of the shadow economy, where weather conditions (a measure for cloudiness) serves as an 
IV for tax morale. Finally Torgler and Schneider (2007) employ a panel data analysis of study 
the  effect  of  tax  morale,  institutional  quality,  and  governance  on  the  size  of  the  shadow 
economy. To instrument for tax morale a measure of cloudiness and an index for moral values 
based on data from the WVS is used. All papers use a Two-Stage Least Squares estimation 
                                                 
36 For further details all papers refer to Schneider (2005a,b). - 17 - 
(2SLS)  and  find  a  statistically  significant  negative  effect  of  tax  morale  on  the  size  of  the 
shadow economy.37 In turn we will discuss each IV approach in more detail. 
In Torgler and Schneider (2009) tax morale and institutional quality is instrumented by 
the following variables: legal origin (English, German and French), latitude, fractionalization 
(language), religion (protestant, catholic), and the legal system (political rights). These IV’s (or 
subsets  of  them)  are  widely  used  in  the  literature  as  a  source  of  exogenous  variation  in 
institutions and their quality (La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and  Vishny, 1999). The 
origin of single IV’s is different. For instance, the idea to use legal origin as an IV has been 
suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998). The authors use 
legal  origins  of  commercial  laws  to  uncover  the  causal  effect  of  legal  rules  on  financial 
development.  It  is  argued  that  legal  origin  is  largely  exogenous,  since  it  was  typically 
introduced into various  countries through conquest and  colonization. Subsequently, a large 
body of research has shown that the influence of legal origins on legal rules is not restricted to 
finance.38 However, the usage of these variables as IV’s is not without critique.
39 Moreover, 
one disadvantage of these IV’s is that most of them do not vary over time, and cannot be 
combined with a fixed effects model. 
In any case, the application of these IV’s for tax morale requires further discussion and 
should not be used ad hoc. A discussion of the expected and actual sign of each IV in the first 
stage would be informative. Further, the assumption that none of these IV’s influences the size 
of  the  shadow  economy  through  channels  other  than  tax  morale  needs  some  support.  For 
instance, it is unclear whether some legal origins are correlated with higher penalties for non-
compliance (or higher enforcement effort), which would have an independent effect on the size 
of the shadow economy. 
Torgler,  Schaffner  and  Macintyre  (2007)  instrument  tax  morale  with  a  measure  for 
cloudiness.  The  authors  cite  literature  showing  that  cloudiness  has  a  negative  impact  on 
individual’s well-being and they find that it has also a statistically significant negative impact 
on tax morale (in their first stage regression). However, it is hard to rule out that weather 
conditions do not have a separate effect on the size of the shadow economy. For instance, the 
                                                 
37 The estimated quantitative impact of tax morale on the size of the shadow economy from OLS and 2SLS can 
unfortunately not be directly compared. In the former case standardized coefficients are listed, while in the latter 
case only conventional (or unstandardized) coefficients are presented. 
38 For a survey of this literature see, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). 
39 Respectively, La Porta et al. (2008) comment on page 326 “[that their] interpretation of the meaning of legal 
origins has evolved considerably over time […] and that is the idea that legal origins – broadly interpreted as 
highly persistent systems of social control of economic life – have significant consequences for the legal and 
regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes”. On page 291 they admit “[that] legal 
origins  influence  many  spheres  of  law  making  and  regulation,  which  makes  it  dangerous  to  use  them  as 
instruments”. - 18 - 
construction  industry,  a  sector  which  is  difficult  to  tax  and  known  for  high  underground 
activity, is affected by weather conditions. In general, bad weather (such as rain, snow, or 
wind) slows down construction activity, and may also reduce the size of the shadow economy. 
Torgler  and  Schneider  (2007)  suggest  a  (in  addition  to  a  measure  of  cloudiness  as 
discussed above) an index for moral values based on data from the WVS as an IV for tax 
morale. This index is based on benefit morale and on the justifiability of avoiding a fare on 
public  transport.  As  expected,  this  index  enters  statistically  significant  in  the  first  stage 
regression  and  the  first  requirement  of  the  IV  is  clearly  fulfilled.  However,  under  the 
assumption that the intrinsic motivation to comply has an impact on compliance behaviour, the 
second assumption could possibly fail. For instance, if a low level of benefit morale translates 
into higher benefit fraud, then the IV is correlated with the error term in the second stage. 
We think that the papers using an IV approach to disentangle the causal effect of tax 
morale on the size of the shadow economy constitute a very promising direction of research. In 
fact,  these  papers  are  some  of  the  rare  exceptions  that  aim  to  address  the  causality  issue 
between  compliance  attitude  and  compliance  behaviour.  We  believe  that  a  waterproof 
identification of this causal effect is almost impossible, since it is hard to think of a natural 
experiment that provides an “as-if” randomly assigned high intrinsic motivation to comply. 
Nevertheless, future research in this area should pursue along the lines of existing empirical 
strategies. However, provide a thorough discussion on the validity of the used IV’s. Murray 
(2006)  states  strikingly  “Indeed,  all  instruments  arrive  on  the  scene  with  a  dark  cloud  of 
invalidity  hanging  overhead.  This  cloud  never  goes  entirely  away,  but  researchers  should 
chase away as much of the cloud as they can.” 
 
4.  The Importance of Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
In this section we want to evaluate the importance of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
in the relation between the intrinsic motivation to comply and actual compliance behavior. 
Therefore, we study the case of tax morale and the shadow economy, or more precisely the 
underground production.  
We  use  estimates  of  the  size  of  the  shadow  economy  from  Schneider,  Buehn  and 
Montenegro (2010). This paper uses a narrow definition of the shadow economy (as suggested 
in  Section  2.1.1)  that  coincides  with  the  underground  production.  Based  on  a  multiple 
indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) model estimates on the size of the underground production - 19 - 
for 162 countries over the period 1999 to 2007 are available.40 If we match this data with 
country-averages of 
WVS TM1  we get a sample of 52 country-years.41  In order to gain more 
observations (in particular observations for countries over time), we amend our data-set with 
estimates of the underground production for the available country-years in the WVS before 
1999.42 In sum, we have an unbalanced panel data-set with 75 observations from 53 countries. 
In line with the literature we find a negative correlation between tax morale and underground 
production in our sample, see Figure 2. However, the correlation coefficient of minus 0.07 is 
not statistically significant different from zero (p-value=0.55).43  
 
[Figure 2 somewhere around here] 
 
In Table 5 we analyze this relationship based on a series of regressions. Column 1 
shows that when controlling for year fixed effects, tax morale and the size of the underground 
production are statistically significantly correlated. This association is lower in OECD-member 
states (see column 3) compared to non-member states (see column 4).44 Most importantly, 
column 5 shows that once we control for country fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on tax 
morale remains statistically significant, but switches sign.45 If we control for a small set of 
control variables (see column 5) the coefficient turns statistically insignificant, however, it 
stays positive.  
 
[Table 5 somewhere around here] 
 
It seems that tax morale is correlated with unobserved country-specific time-invariant 
heterogeneity in a way that disregarding country fixed effects can diametrically reverse results. 
The  suggested  positive  relationship  between  tax  morale  and  the  size  of  the  underground 
production is counter-intuitive. That means, either our measurements of tax morale and/or the 
                                                 
40 Details on the estimation method are provided in Section 3.1 of Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010). 
41 The notes to Table 5 list these country-years. 
42 Prof. Schneider kindly provided data on the estimated size of the underground production based on a MIMIC 
model  for  the  following  country-years:  Australia  (1995),  Austria  (1990),  Belgium  (1990),  Canada  (1990), 
Denmark (1990), Finland (1990), Finland (1996), France 1990), Germany (1990, 1997), Ireland (1990), Italy 
(1990),  Japan  (1990,  1995),  Spain  (1990,  1995),  Sweden  (1990,  1996),  Switzerland  (1989,  1996),  United 
Kingdom (1990) and United States (1990, 1995). 
43 Notably, as Figures A1 to A4 (in the Appendix) show, the correlation between the other available tax morale 
variables  and  the  estimated  underground  production  is  in  each  case  positive.  For 
ESS TM2 and 
ISSP TM2   the 
correlation coefficient is even statistically significant at conventional levels. 
44 Column 2 shows, as expected, that the underground production is on average lower in OECD-member states 
(about minus 14 percent of the GDP). 
45 We do not have observations over time for non-OECD-member states. - 20 - 
underground  production  have  fundamental  problems,  or  unobserved  time-varying 
unobservables are crucial. In the latter case an IV-strategy (as described in Section 2.3) can be 
used  to  fix  the  problem.  An  ideal  IV  would  vary  over  time,  such  that  the  IV  strategy 
complements the fixed effects model. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Why  should  economists  be  interested  in  the  (determinants  of  the)  intrinsic  motivation  to 
comply, if this variable has no causal impact on actual compliance behavior? In this paper we 
argued  that  a  good  understanding  of  this  relationship  is  very  important  for  this  strand  of 
literature and further empirical evidence is needed. We think future research should pursue 
empirical strategies that are able to establish a causal link between these two dimensions.  
We see three (potentially) feasible endeavors that could help to uncover a causal effect. 
First,  we  suggest  trying  to  create  a  link  between  randomized  in  depth-audits  (such  as  the 
TCMP) and panel survey data. Second, we recommend laboratory experiments augmented with 
well designed survey techniques. The effect of survey participation on compliance behavior 
could be checked with random assignment to different groups with a pre-experimental survey, 
a post-experimental survey, and no survey. Third, scholars should pursue along the lines of 
existing IV approaches, however, provide a thorough discussion of the validity of the used 
IV’s. - 21 - 
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Appendix 
 








Notes: AL: Albania, AR: Argentina, AT: Austria, AU: Australia, BA: Bosnia and Herzegovina, BD: 
Bangladesh, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, BY: Belarus, CA: Canada, CH: Switzerland, CN: China, 
CZ: Czech Republic, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, DZ: Algeria, EG: Egypt, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, 
FR:  France,  GB:  United  Kingdom,  GR:  Greece,  HR:  Croatia,  HU:  Hungary,  ID:  Indonesia,  IE: 
Ireland,  IN:  India,  IR:  Iran,  IS:  Iceland,  IT:  Italy,  JO:  Jordan,  JP:  Japan,  KG:  Kyrgyzstan,  KR: 
Republic of Korea, KV: Latvia, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, MA: Morocco, MD: Republic of 
Moldova, MK: Republic of Macedonia, MT: Malta, MX: Mexico, SE: Sweden, SV: El Salvador, TR: 
Turkey,  TZ:  United  Republic  of  Tanzania,  UA:  Ukraine,  UG:  Uganda,  US:  United  States,  VE: 
Venezuela, VN: Vietnam, ZW: Zimbabwe. - 26 - 




Notes: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, BY: Belarus, CZ: Czech Republic, DE: Germany, 
DK: Denmark, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GB: United Kingdom, GR: Greece, HR: Croatia, 
HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IS: Iceland, IT: Italy, KV: Latvia, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, MT: 
Malta, SE: Sweden, TR: Turkey, UA: Ukraine. 
 




Notes:  AT:  Austria,  BE:  Belgium,  CH:  Switzerland,  CZ:  Czech  Republic,  DE:  Germany,  DK: 
Denmark, EE: Estonia, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GB: United Kingdom, GR: Greece, HU: 
Hungary, IE: Ireland, IS: Iceland, LU: Luxembourg, SE: Sweden, TR: Turkey, UA: Ukraine. - 27 - 
 




Notes:  AT:  Austria,  BE:  Belgium,  CH:  Switzerland,  CZ:  Czech  Republic,  DE:  Germany,  DK: 
Denmark, EE: Estonia, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GB: United Kingdom, GR: Greece, HU: 
Hungary, IE: Ireland, IS: Iceland, LU: Luxembourg, SE: Sweden, TR: Turkey, UA: Ukraine. 
 




Notes: AT: Austria, AU: Australia, CA: Canada, CH: Switzerland, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, ES: 
Spain, FR: France, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, JP: Japan SE: Sweden, US: United 
States. 
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Table A1: Available Survey Data on Tax Morale
a 
Survey  Question  Answers  Years covered 




Total no.  
of country-
years 
WVS  WVS TM1 : “Please tell me for each of the following statements 
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, 
or something in between: Cheating on taxes if you have a 
chance”. 
Respondents are asked to evaluate on an ordered scale 





















80  184 
 
WVS  WVS TM2 : “Please tell me for each of the following statements 
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, 
or something in between: Paying cash for services to avoid 
taxes”. 
Respondents are asked to evaluate on an ordered scale 





33  33 
ESS  ESS TM1 : “How much you agree or disagree with each of these 
statements: Citizens should not cheat on their taxes” 
Respondents can answer: “agree strongly” (1), “agree” 
(2), “neither agree nor disagree” (3), “disagree” (4), or 




25  25 
ESS  ESS TM2 : “How wrong, if at all, do you consider the following 
ways of behaving to be? How wrong is someone paying cash 
with no receipt so as to avoid paying VAT or other taxes?” 
Respondents can answer: “not wrong at all” (1), “a bit 




25  25 
ISSP  ISSP TM : “Consider the following situations below. Do you feel 
it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his 
or her income in order to pay less income tax?” 
Respondents can answer: “not wrong” (1), “a bit 
wrong” (2), “wrong” (3), or “seriously wrong” (4). 
1991 (17) 
1998 (31) 
31  48 - 29 - 
Table A2: Available Survey Data on Benefit Morale
a 
Survey  Question  Answers  Years covered 




Total no.  
of country-
years 
WVS  WVS BM : “Please tell me for each of the following statements 
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, 
or something in between: Claiming governments benefits to 
which you are not entitled”. 
Respondents are asked to evaluate on an ordered scale 





















81  186 
 
ISSP  ISSP BM : “Consider the following situations below. Do you feel 
it is wrong or not wrong if a person gives the government 
incorrect information about himself to get government benefits 
that he is not entitled to” 
Respondents can answer: “not wrong” (1), “a bit 
wrong” (2), “wrong” (3), or “seriously wrong” (4). 
1991 (17) 
1998 (31) 
31  48 
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Table 1: Comparison of the Survey Questions on Tax Morale in the WVS
a 
 
  N  WVS TM1  
WVS TM2  
WVS WVS TM TM 2 1 -   ( )
WVS WVS TM TM Corr 2 1 ,  
  Austria  1,467  8.91  7.84  1.06  0.47 
Belarus  824  6.76  7.05  -0.29  0.62 
Belgium  1,833  7.37  6.74  0.63  0.45 
Bulgaria  923  9.03  9.32  -0.29  0.52 
Croatia  987  8.25  8.05  0.20  0.65 
Czech Republic  1,849  8.98  8.62  0.35  0.55 
Denmark  1,007  8.99  6.69  2.29  0.38 
Estonia  901  7.83  7.73  0.11  0.60 
Finland  1,017  8.45  7.37  1.08  0.55 
France  1,551  7.97  6.86  1.11  0.49 
Germany  1,935  8.65  8.31  0.34  0.67 
Great Britain  977  8.56  7.52  1.04  0.53 
Greece  1,061  7.81  6.98  0.83  0.35 
Hungary  947  8.90  8.37  0.53  0.55 
Iceland  957  8.77  8.30  0.46  0.58 
Ireland  976  8.72  8.10  0.62  0.49 
Italy  1,948  8.61  8.51  0.10  0.49 
Latvia  970  8.63  7.94  0.69  0.54 
Lithuania  860  7.08  6.56  0.52  0.53 
Luxembourg  1,128  7.64  7.01  0.63  0.47 
Malta  1,002  9.47  8.94  0.53  0.48 
Netherlands  995  8.27  6.74  1.53  0.38 
Northern Ireland  898  8.63  7.98  0.65  0.55 
Poland  945  8.86  8.29  0.57  0.36 
Portugal  954  8.60  8.72  -0.12  0.67 
Romania  979  8.23  8.17  0.07  0.29 
Russian   2,138  7.97  7.86  0.11  0.51 
Slovakia  1,271  8.84  7.34  1.50  0.38 
Slovenia  987  8.66  7.73  0.93  0.49 
Spain  1,095  8.63  7.65  0.97  0.43 
Sweden  1,002  8.57  7.20  1.37  0.42 
Turkey  1,195  9.82  9.63  0.19  0.34 
Ukraine  981  7.56  7.50  0.07  0.62 
 
Mean  1,168  8.42  7.81  0.62  0.50 
  aColumn 1 shows the available observations per country. Columns 2 to 4 list the respective country-means. 
Column 5 shows the correlation coefficient within a country. For the definition of 
WVS TM1  and 
WVS TM2  see 
Table A1. - 31 - 
Table 2: Comparison of the Survey Questions on Tax Morale in the ESS
a 
         
  N  ESS TM1  
ESS TM 2   ( )
ESS ESS TM TM Corr 2 1 ,  
         
Austria   2,040  3.91  2.25  0.27 
Belgium   1,728  3.58  2.28  0.31 
Switzerland   2,059  4.02  2.65  0.21 
Czech Republic  2,661  4.09  2.77  0.25 
Germany   2,706  3.80  2.36  0.32 
Denmark   1,450  4.10  2.74  0.40 
Estonia   1,772  4.14  2.75  0.20 
Spain   1,529  3.92  2.65  0.17 
Finland   1,988  4.11  2.77  0.34 
France   1,784  4.04  2.12  0.29 
Great Britain  1,865  3.94  2.59  0.30 
Greece   2,321  3.93  3.06  0.25 
Hungary   1,420  4.17  2.68  0.25 
Ireland   2,231  4.08  2.65  0.21 
Iceland   558  4.10  2.91  0.37 
Luxembourg   1,505  3.98  2.27  0.11 
Netherlands   1,853  3.93  2.40  0.24 
Norway   1,749  3.94  2.75  0.40 
Poland   1,620  4.08  2.58  0.28 
Portugal   1,924  4.17  3.00  0.17 
Sweden   1,916  3.90  2.81  0.32 
Slovenia   1,382  4.08  2.58  0.25 
Slovakia   1,416  3.93  2.72  0.16 
Turkey   1,713  4.47  3.23  0.20 
Ukraine   1,612  3.90  2.68  0.28 
         
Mean  1,792  4.01  2.65  0.26 
          aColumn 1 shows the available observations per country. Columns 2 and 3 list 
the respective country-means. Column 4 shows the correlation coefficient 
within a country. For the definition of 
ESS TM1  and 
ESS TM 2  see Table A1. Note, 
we recoded 
ESS TM1  such that higher values indicate a higher tax morale. - 32 - 
Table 3: Correlation among Different Measurements of Tax Morale and Benefit Morale
a 
                  WVS TM1  
WVS TM2  
ESS TM1  
ESS TM2   ISSP TM  
WVS BM  
ISSP BM  
WVS TM1   1             
WVS TM2   0.692*** 
(N=33)  1           
ESS TM1  
- 
  -  1         
 
ESS TM2  
-  -  0.584*** 
(N=25)  1       






b  -  -  1     






  -  -0.081 
(N=41)  1   








b  1 
                aFor the definition of the variables see Table A1 and A2. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level. - 33 - 
Table 4: Relation of Tax Morale with Socio-economic Characteristics
a 
            Dependent variable 
  WVS TM1  
WVS TM2  
ESS TM1  
ESS TM 2  
          Age  0.023***  0.025***  0.005***  0.006*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Female  0.338***  0.360***  0.104***  0.040*** 
  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Married
b  0.198***  0.180***  0.066***  0.057*** 
  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Children
c  -0.032  0.003  -0.044*  -0.033** 
  (0.048)  (0.065)  (0.023)  (0.013) 
School leaving age
d  0.012**  0.005  0.008***  0.005* 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Household income
e  -0.020**  -0.044***  0.001  -0.012** 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Self-employed
f  -0.304***  -0.150  -0.107***  -0.042 
  (0.084)  (0.105)  (0.023)  (0.030) 
Unemployed
f  -0.223***  -0.036  -0.021  -0.008 
  (0.065)  (0.052)  (0.034)  (0.029) 
Out of labor force
f  0.061  0.086*  0.036**  0.028** 
  (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Size of place of residence
g  -0.125***  -0.132**  0.010  0.033** 
  (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
          No. of observations  30,773  30,773  28,778  28,778 
Adjusted R-squared  0.112  0.126  0.052  0.105 
          aThe dependent variable is in each estimation a measure of tax morale (TM), where higher values indicate a higher 
level of TM. In columns 2 and 3 TM is measured on a ten point-scale; in columns 4 and 5 on a four-point scale (see 
Tab). Each estimation includes country and year fixed effects. Method of estimation is ordinary least squares. 
Standard errors (allowing for clustering by countries) are in parentheses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level. 
bThis is a binary variable equal to one if 
the individual is married, and zero otherwise. 
cThis is a binary variable equal to one if the individual is parent, and 
zero otherwise. 
dIn the case of the columns 2 and 3 (data from the WVS) some observations have been imputed 
base on the highest educational level. For detailed information please refer to the Data Appendix in Halla and 
Schneider (2008). 
eIn the case of columns 2 and 3 this ordinal variable is measured on a ten-point scale; in columns 
4  and  5  on  a  twelve-point  scale. 
fThe  base  group  is  equal  to  employed  individuals. 
gThis  ordinal  variable  is 
measured on a three-point scale.  
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Table 5: Tax Morale and the Size of the Underground Production
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












  WVS TM1   -4.639**  -4.225**  -3.544*  -5.183*  2.829**  2.152 
  (1.870)  (1.621)  (1.779)  (2.712)  (1.284)  (1.708) 
GDP p. c. (in $1,000)
a            0.064 
            (0.329) 
GDP deflator
a            0.014 
            (0.221) 
Population size (in mill.)
a            -0.053 
            (0.052) 
OECD
b     -13.517***         
    (2.854)         
Constant  46.722**  76.857***  43.402***  84.792***  2.863  -9.046 
  (19.064)  (16.036)  (15.299)  (25.423)  (8.613)  (21.243) 
 
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  no  no  no  no  yes  yes 
  No. of observations  75  75  46  29  46  46 
Adjusted R-squared  0.366  0.525  0.316  0.009  0.979  0.977 
   
aThe dependent variable is in each case an estimate of the underground production measured as percentage of GDP. Schneider, 
Buehn and Montenegro (2010) is the source of the following country-years: Albania (2002), Algeria (2002), Argentina (1999), 
Austria (1999), Bangladesh (2002), Belgium (1999), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001), Bulgaria (1999), Belarus (2000), Canada 
(2000), Chile (2000), China (2001), Croatia (1999), Czech Republic (1999), Denmark (1999), El Salvador (1999), Finland 
(2000), France (1999), Germany (1999), Greece (1999), Hungary (1999), Iceland (1999), India (2001), Indonesia (2001), Iran 
(2000), Ireland (1999), Italy (1999), Japan (2000), Jordan (2001), Republic of Korea (2001), Kyrgyzstan (2003), Latvia (1999), 
Lithuania (1999), Luxembourg (1999), Malta (1999), Mexico (2000), Republic of Moldova (2002), Morocco (2001), Vietnam 
(2001),  Zimbabwe  (2001),  Spain  (1999),  Spain  (2000),  Sweden  (1999),  Turkey  (2001),  Uganda  (2001),  Ukraine  (1999), 
Republic of Macedonia (2001), Egypt (2000), United Kingdom (1999), United Republic of Tanzania (2001), United States 
(1999)  and  Venezuela  (2000).  The  remaining  country-years  –  Australia  (1995),  Austria  (1990),  Belgium  (1990),  Canada 
(1990), Denmark (1990), Finland (1990), Finland (1996), France 1990), Germany (1990, 1997), Ireland (1990), Italy (1990), 
Japan (1990, 1995), Spain (1990, 1995), Sweden (1990, 1996), Switzerland (1989, 1996), United Kingdom (1990) and United 
States (1990, 1995) – are imputed by estimates kindly provided by Prof. Schneider. Method of estimation is ordinary least 
squares. Standard are in parentheses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent 
level, and 1-percent level.
 aThis variable is derived from the OECD Factbook 2007. 
bThis is a binary variable equal to one if the 
country is an OECD-member state, and zero otherwise.  - 35 - 
 